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As the organizers of the conference, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to our 
honorary advisers, Bennet T. McCallum and Maurice Obstfeld, and all other participants at the 
conference for their fruitful presentations and discussions. Our special thanks go to Junko 
Miyoshi and other staff members of the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, who 
devotedly helped to organize the conference. The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Japan. 
 
  1
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
held the 2008 International Conference entitled “Frontiers in Monetary Theory and 
Policy” on May 28 and 29, 2008, at the Bank of Japan Head Office in Tokyo.
1 The 
conference was aimed at understanding the frontiers in monetary theory and policy. 
About 100 distinguished guests from academia, international organizations, and central 
banks participated in the conference.
2 
The conference began with opening remarks by the Governor of the BOJ, 
Masaaki Shirakawa, followed by introductory remarks by the honorary adviser of 
IMES,  Bennett T. McCallum (Carnegie Mellon University). Six sessions and the 
Mayekawa Lecture followed. John B. Taylor (Stanford University) gave the first 
Mayekawa Lecture. Papers were presented by Michael Woodford (Columbia 
University), Keisuke Otsu (Sophia University, formerly BOJ-IMES), Mark Gertler 
(New York University), George Evans (University of Oregon), Lawrence Christiano 
(Northwestern University), and Christopher Sims (Princeton University). The 
discussants were Miles Kimball (University of Michigan), Selahattin Imrohoroglu 
(University of Southern California), Michael Krause (Deutsche Bundesbank), James 
Bullard (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Andrew Levin (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System), and Frank Smets (European Central Bank). The 
conference ended with the concluding remarks by the honorary adviser of IMES, 
Maurice Obstfeld (University of California, Berkeley) after the panel discussion on 
“Frontiers in Monetary Theory and Policy” chaired by the Deputy Governor of the BOJ, 
Kiyohiko Nishumura, with short presentations on the research frontiers by Woodford, 
Taylor, Gertler, G. Evans, Christiano, Sims, Obstfeld, and McCallum. 
In the opening remarks,
3  Shirakawa first stressed that monetary policy and 
financial system policy were related in a complex and delicate manner and the 
distinction between these two policies was often not very clear. Then he raised three 
challenges for monetary policy: (1) how to define and understand price stability; (2) 
how to design financial system policy; and (3) how to maintain the stable financial 
system and well-functioning financial markets for effective monetary policy, namely, 
how to conduct the banking policy of central banks. Finally, he emphasized the 
importance of the learning nexus between central banks and academia, such that central 
banks conveyed to academia whatever puzzles were found in practice and the theories 
developed in academic circles were fed back to central bank circles as valuable input for 
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2  See Appendix 2 for a list of the participants. Their affiliation is as of the time the conference was 
held. 
3  For details, see Shirakawa (2008).  2
the proper conduct of monetary policy. 
In the introductory remarks,
4  McCallum first summarized the achievements in 
monetary economics such as developments in structural models that are respectful of 
both theory and evidence with a policy instrument that agreed with practice, namely 
successful inflation targeting in practice. Then he pointed out subjects of ongoing 
disputes such as the empirical performance of key relationships in models; 
communication and commitment mechanisms; and the relationship of monetary policy 
to credit, fiscal, and foreign exchange policies, among others. He concluded his remarks 
by introducing the presenters and their achievements with a brief summary of the 
presented papers. 
In the concluding remarks,
5  Obstfeld first summarized the presentations and 
discussions at the conference. Then he discussed global imbalances as a theme related to 
the conference presentations. He related global imbalances to Sims’ presentation on the 
fiscal theory of the price level and to Taylor’s presentation on global inflation under a 
pegged exchange rate scheme. He showed that the large current-account deficit of the 
United States predicted depreciation since its reduction to a more sustainable level will 
require a reduction in United States demand and an increase in foreign demand.
6  
Finally, he concluded that there was clearly a monetary cooperation payoff to 
eliminating these global imbalances. 
  The following sections summarize the Mayekawa Lecture, the six presentations 
and subsequent discussions, and the panel discussions on “Frontiers in Monetary Theory 
and Policy.” 
 
The Mayekawa Lecture: The Way Back to Stability and Growth in the 
Global Economy
7 
Taylor presented the inaugural Mayekawa Lecture, entitled “The Way Back to Stability 
and Growth in the Global Economy.” The lecture was named after Haruo Mayekawa, 
who served as the 24th Governor of the BOJ from 1979 to 1984. Taylor reviewed 
Mayekawa’s achievements during the difficult environment in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. While noting the very important difference in economic vantage points between 
the late 1970s/early 1980s and 2008, he stressed the importance of a comprehensive 
“Mayekawan” approach to research and policy when considering the numerous 
economic difficulties of today. The difficulties were (1) high and rising global inflation; 
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7 For a brief summary of the career of Haruo Mayekawa, see Appendix 3. For details on the 
Mayekawa Lecture, see Taylor (2008).  3
(2) financial instability and risks; (3) high and rising prices of energy, food, and many 
other commodities; (4) continuing high current account imbalances; (5) globally 
inconsistent exchange rate policies; and (6) rising protectionism and isolationist 
sentiment. He pointed out that as Mayekawa stressed many years ago, it was a challenge 
for policymakers to adopt a more comprehensive international policy focus that 
recognized the important interaction of these economic problems simultaneously, 
instead of approaching them separately. He concluded with the remark that 
policymakers might begin with discussions about some kind of “global inflation target,” 
and expected that if we extrapolated from the recommendations of Mayekawa in the 
1980s, we could hope for a way back to stability and growth in the global economy. 
 
Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy
8 
Woodford presented his work with Vasco Cúrdia extending the basic 
(representative-household) New Keynesian model to allow for a spread between the 
interest rates available to savers and borrowers, which was allowed to vary for either 
exogenous or endogenous reasons. They found that the mere existence of a positive 
average spread made little quantitative difference for the predicted effects of particular 
policies. They then reported that variation in spreads over time had more important 
consequences both for the equilibrium relation between the policy rate and aggregate 
expenditure, and for the relation between real activity and inflation. Nevertheless, they 
found that the target criterion which characterized optimal policy in the basic New 
Keynesian model continued to provide a good approximation to optimal policy, even in 
the presence of variations in credit spreads. They also considered a “spread-adjusted 
Taylor rule,” in which the intercept of the Taylor rule was adjusted in proportion to 
changes in credit spreads. They showed that while such an adjustment could improve 
upon an unadjusted Taylor rule, the optimal degree of adjustment was less than 100 
percent; and even with the correct size of adjustment, such a rule of thumb remained 
inferior to the targeting rule. 
In his comments on the paper, Kimball recommended that the study provide 
more intuition at a deep level on the financial shocks. He then raised some broader 
issues concerning the New Keynesian framework, focusing especially on the 
importance of investment and other durables in business cycles. He conjectured that if 
the investment and durables were introduced, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
for borrowers would be much higher than for savers, and in that case, adjusting the 
policy rate one for one with the credit spread would be more desirable. He claimed that 
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a workhorse model should include investment and durables by incorporating a 
reasonable size of the investment adjustment cost. He also questioned the 
parameterization of high price elasticity of demand for each variety of good, which 
yielded a very strong weight on inflation in quadratic objective functions. 
From the floor, some participants asked whether there was any micro evidence 
of the particular types of credit frictions and whether such frictions were relevant in the 
recent environment in the financial markets. Woodford responded that the paper took 
the evolution of financial frictions as given, and that the analysis in the paper was not 
attempting to address the question of what the Federal Reserve Board should have done 
with regard to liquidity-provision facilities, as distinguished from its interest-rate policy 
decisions.  Woodford admitted the simplification of the study and stated that if the 
evolution of financial frictions depended on monetary policy, monetary policy and 
banking policy could not be separated. There was another question as to how the 
inclusion of bankruptcy would change the implications of the study. Woodford 
conjectured that the results would not change much, because the study had already 
introduced bank capital as a factor of production in an implicit manner. One participant 
asked how the inclusion of the credit spread mattered for monetary policy in the 
presence of the zero interest rate lower bound. Woodford responded that the zero lower 
bound would be an even more relevant problem in the presence of credit frictions, 
because these frictions required the policy rate to be lower than the natural level for the 
average interest rate. 
 
The Global Impact of Chinese Growth
9 
Ippei Fujiwara (BOJ-IMES), Otsu, and Masashi Saito (BOJ) discussed the effects of 
the opening up of China and its rapid growth on the welfare of both China and the rest 
of the world. They first pointed out three characteristics of Chinese growth: (1) Chinese 
openness (trade volume/GDP) increased suddenly from 10 percent to 40 percent soon 
after the policy of reform and opening was introduced in 1978; (2) the Chinese per 
capita GDP growth rate jumped from 2.5 percent to 8 percent in 1978; and (3) trade was 
roughly balanced, especially prior to 1978. They then asked how these affected the G-7 
countries. For this purpose, a standard two-country model following Backus, Kehoe, 
and Kydland (1994) was calibrated for China and the G-7 aggregate. The model was to 
reproduce the above three facts with three implied shocks (wedges), home bias in the 
final goods production in China, productivity in the intermediate goods production in 
China, and import tariffs. Then such a model was simulated to investigate the effects of 
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each shock on the welfare of the G-7 countries. The authors concluded that with the 
balanced trade constraint, opening up per se was welfare improving for China but had 
little impact on the welfare of the rest of the world, but productivity growth in China 
was welfare improving for both China and the G-7 countries. Furthermore, it was shown 
that removing the balanced trade constraint would have improved Chinese welfare and 
deteriorated the welfare of the rest of the world. 
In his comments on the paper, Imrohoroglu discussed important issues related 
to the robustness of the results and computation of the total factor productivity (TFP). In 
particular, the importance of the sensitivity analyses with different values of the 
elasticity of substitution and home bias in the Armington aggregator was stressed. 
Although the data limitation was acknowledged, it was recommended that the authors 
look into data such as bilateral trade data to compute the TFP in China. Finally, as part 
of the agenda for future research, he suggested evaluating the welfare implication in the 
model with technology diffusion, such as a link from the imports of capital goods 
leading to an increase in the productivity of Chinese final goods production. 
First, following the comments by Imrohoroglu, Fujiwara, Otsu, and Saito 
admitted the necessity to compute the TFP in China and showed that the results did not 
change a lot with different values of elasticity. From the floor, there were such 
comments as that the fact that an opening policy was modeled as the preference shift not 
as an actual reduction of any barriers to trade should have huge implications on welfare; 
the implied tariffs did not look like the actual data; and how greater varieties of goods 
being available to the rest of the world as the result of China’s opening up affected the 
welfare of the rest of the world. For the first comment, they responded that the shift in 
the home bias was the technological change and added that it was difficult to produce 
the jump in the openness with other shocks. Regarding the second comment, they noted 
it would be better to consider the shocks in the paper as wedges. Finally, in reply to the 
question, they agreed that a model with endogenous variety as in Melitz (2003) should 
be a natural extension in the future to evaluate the welfare tension between more 
varieties versus fewer terms of trade improvements in the rest of the world.   
 
An Estimated Monetary DSGE Model with Unemployment and 
Staggered Nominal Wage Bargaining
10 
Gertler presented a model that was not susceptible to the critique of Barro (1977). In 
the existing model, employment adjusted on the intensive margin along with staggered 
nominal wage bargaining. This wage rigidity was the key in accounting for labor market 
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volatility and also influenced the short-run output/inflation tradeoff as shown in 
Blanchard and Galí (2007). Yet such a model implied that there were unexploited gains 
from renegotiation. Gertler estimated the variant of a conventional monetary dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) that allowed for unemployment and staggered 
nominal wage bargaining, where unemployment was introduced via a variant of the 
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching framework and wage rigidity via 
the staggered Nash bargaining as in Gertler and Trigari (2006). As employment adjusted 
along the extensive margin, this model addressed the Barro critique and was consistent 
with evidence at the same time. Finally, he showed that wage rigidity improved the 
quantitative performance and the model could obtain the similar fit of the data as in 
Smets and Wouters (2007). Furthermore, he added that more work was needed to ensure 
the robust identification of key labor market parameters. 
  In his comments on the paper, Krause pointed out that this was the first paper 
to combine Calvo-style nominal wage rigidity with the Nash bargaining framework, the 
authors extracted new economic insights, namely, the spillover effect from the aggregate 
wage to the firm-level wage, and the fit of the model could be compared with the 
benchmark model as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Then he added several comments as 
to how much the hiring cost function mattered; why the model performed very well 
without wage rigidity contrary to Shimer (2004); intensive margin adjustments, which 
were absent in the model, seemed to be important for the short run; and it seemed 
unreasonable that real wage rigidity entered by non-structural indexation. 
  Gertler responded to Krause’s comments that the quadratic adjustment might 
interact with the wage rigidity and different estimates of the exogenous forcing process 
were obtained regarding the volatility in the model with and without wage rigidity. 
Several participants also insisted that adjustments in hours worked were important, and 
some related this problem to whether the model actually addressed the Barro (1977) 
critique. Gertler responded that there was a lot of variation in the low frequency in 
hours per worker which was not due to Frisch elasticity, but he agreed about the 
importance of taking this point into account. There were further questions on the 
plausibility of priors, indexation, and Calvo-style rigidity. Gertler responded that the 
results did not change with looser priors, they incorporated indexation to check how 
large it was, and Calvo-style rigidity was incorporated just for computational 
convenience. 
  7
Robust Learning Stability with Operational Monetary Policy Rules
11 
G. Evans examined stability under least-squares learning of rational expectations 
equilibrium for alternative interest rate rules in New Keynesian models. Based on some 
empirical evidence, he introduced discounted (constant gain) least-squares learning, 
which weighed recent data more heavily than older data. This learning algorithm 
implied that there was concern the economy might be subject to structural change. The 
“robust stability” of rational expectations equilibrium was defined as stability under 
discounted least-squares learning, for a range of gain parameters. He showed that for 
operational forms of policy rules in the sense of McCallum (1999), that is, rules which 
did not depend on contemporaneous values of endogenous aggregate variables, many 
interest rate rules, including instrument rules, optimal reaction functions under 
discretion or commitment, did not exhibit robust stability. He also showed that the 
expectations-based optimal rules, which responded to private agents’ expectations in an 
appropriate way, delivered robust stability. 
In his comments on the paper, Bullard remarked that stability under learning 
has not been sufficiently investigated in macroeconomics. He remarked that, in 
particular, instability under learning has not been sufficiently investigated because 
actual unstable learning dynamics are rarely observed. He claimed, however, that the 
instability shown in the paper and some historical examples, such as the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, suggest that the issue of stability is potentially important for 
policymaking. He then cautioned policymakers against a naive application of rational 
expectations, because optimal monetary policies under the rational expectations 
hypothesis could never be optimal under learning if the policies produced instability. He 
finally raised some issues related to responding to agents’ expectations, such as 
measurement of expectations and potential games among agents and policymakers. 
From the floor, some participants claimed that the analysis using learning 
behavior would be more important in global dynamics than in local dynamics. G. Evans 
agreed with this point, explaining that such an analysis was carried out in other papers, 
which examined the issue of hyperinflation or a liquidity trap. There was a claim that 
the environment of the study might be unreasonable, because there were no structural 
changes in the actual economic environment even though private agents were worried 
about it. G. Evans claimed that the environment was just a natural benchmark. He then 
stated that in his other study he examined the value of an optimal constant gain when 
structural changes actually occurred. Some participants pointed out that stability under 
learning might depend on information available to policymakers when making forecasts 
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about current endogenous variables. G. Evans remarked that there might be a better way 
to introduce a more realistic setup regarding information availability, although it would 
require continuous time formulations, which were hard to introduce in this kind of 
analysis. 
 
Monetary Policy and Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycles
12 
Christiano sought to answer the question of whether monetary policy was responsible 
for the very high volatility in asset markets. He supposed a situation where asset price 
booms were triggered by an expectation of improved future productivity, which did not 
materialize. There, inflation-targeting central banks with sticky nominal wage contracts 
created the suboptimal volatility in asset prices. He concluded that boom-bust cycles 
could hardly be understood without monetary policy. The mechanism for the boom-bust 
cycles in the model was as follows. The expectation of improved future productivity 
resulted in lower expected marginal cost in the future and therefore in lower current 
inflation rates due to the sticky price and wage settings. Then the inflation-targeting 
central bank reduced its policy rate and eventually asset prices increased. This result 
contradicted conventional wisdom, which assumed inflation rising in stock market 
booms, but he showed that empirically inflation was low during the boom but tended to 
rise near the end and that his model could reproduce these facts. He further compared 
the performances of the standard Taylor rule with the Ramsey optimal monetary policy. 
He concluded that monetary policy in the form of the standard Taylor rule was 
suboptimal. Yet at the same time, it was shown that the modified Taylor rule, where the 
price inflation term was replaced by wage inflation, could mitigate the suboptimality of 
monetary policy. 
In his comments on the paper, Levin began by emphasizing the pitfalls of 
macroeconometric equivalence and microeconomic dissonance in conducting welfare 
analysis of monetary policy. He then commented specifically on each of the three 
historical episodes. The stock market boom of 1928-29 was probably not induced by a 
large upward shift in expected future productivity growth, but may have reflected 
various imperfections in financial market regulations. During the 1960s, the deviations 
of real equity prices from trend were quite transitory, rather than exhibiting a sharp 
boom, and the bust of the 1970s may have reflected the sharp increase in oil prices and 
the unanchoring of long-run inflation expectations.  Finally, while an upward shift in 
anticipated productivity growth may have triggered the stock market boom of the late 
1990s, this mechanism cannot account for the subsequent bust in 2000-01, because 
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surveys of professional forecasters indicate that expectations of long-run output growth 
remained elevated from 1999 until about 2003. 
There were also questions from the floor about the relationship between the 
model’s simulation and historical episodes. Christiano responded that it was very 
important to investigate whether there was evidence for this kind of boom-bust cycle in 
the historical episodes. Some asked about the implementation of the Ramsey policy for 
the expectation shock. Christiano stated that such a policy would be difficult to 
implement with the operational rule, but it should be checked whether desirable 
allocation under such a policy could be produced under the targeting criteria. 
 
Stepping on a Rake: The Role of Fiscal Policy in the Inflation of the 
1970s
13 
The high inflation of the 1970s in the United States was often attributed solely to the 
errors of monetary policy. Sims provided an alternative view that the vagaries of fiscal 
policy played an important role for the high inflation in this period, based on the 
framework of the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). He showed that in the presence 
of uncertainty about future fiscal policy, monetary policy instruments, which followed 
the so-called Taylor principle, might lose potency or have perverse effects. This was 
because the rise of the interest rate against inflation would increase the rate of issue of 
nominal government debt, which accelerated the inflation rate if private agents believed 
that newly issued nominal debt was only partially backed by future taxes. He showed 
that if monetary policy pegged the interest rate, the equilibrium price level became 
unique and stable. He demonstrated this mechanism by presenting the impulse 
responses to fiscal/monetary policy shocks in two kinds of calibrated models: 
flexible/sticky price models and an estimated structural vector autoregression (VAR) 
model.  
In his comments on the paper, Smets asked how the various additional features, 
such as sticky prices, habit formation, and long-term debt, mattered for the impulse 
responses. He pointed out that the impulse response of the sticky price model to a 
monetary policy shock was inconsistent with the price puzzle, which had been 
originally found by Sims (1980). In particular, the fact that the price puzzle was more 
prominent before the 1980s than after the 1980s appeared to be inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that U.S. policy had shifted from an active fiscal/passive monetary (AF/PM) 
regime in the 1970s to a passive fiscal/active monetary (PF/AM) regime in the 1980s. 
He also pointed out that the FTPL had implications for the impact of fiscal policy 
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shocks on private consumption which were more in line with VAR evidence from the 
1970s and 1980s. Finally, he asked which policy regime, AF/PM or PF/AM, was 
preferable from the normative viewpoint. 
In the general discussion, Sims remarked that the existence of the price puzzle 
depended on some parameterizations, including the degree of price stickiness. He 
claimed, however, that in identifying a structural VAR model, he maintained a plausible 
assumption that a contractionary monetary policy shock at least eventually produced a 
decline in the inflation rate. Regarding normative policy regimes, he did not insist that 
AF/PM was preferable, because sometimes the same equilibrium could be supported in 
either PF/AM or AF/PM. He cautioned, however, that monetary economists should not 
ignore completely the role of fiscal policy in controlling the inflation rate. From the 
floor, there was a question as to why Japan’s price level did not rise in the latter half of 
the 1990s, even though the Japanese government had a huge level of debt and Japan’s 
monetary policy was severely constrained by the zero lower bound, which implied an 
AF/PM regime. Sims responded that Japan’s experience was puzzling, but it would be 
important to understand what Japanese people had believed about future fiscal policy 
during that period. 
 
 
Panel Discussion on Frontiers in Monetary Theory and Policy 
In the panel discussion chaired by Nishimura, Woodford, Taylor, Gertler, G. Evans, 
Christiano, Sims, Obstfeld, and McCallum stated their views on the achievements, 
limitations, and perspectives in their research field in short presentations. General 
discussion then followed. 
 
Michael Woodford 
Woodford remarked that one of the most important topics for monetary policy analysis 
was the robustness of policy proposals. He then stated that a robust approach to 
monetary policy was to focus on (1) defining target criteria, (2) committing to a policy 
to satisfy the target, and (3) trying to ensure the target, given the information on current 
economic conditions. He claimed that this kind of policymaking was more robust than 
some approaches which introduced a particular rule for setting its instrument as a 
function of some indicators. He agreed with the implication of the paper of G. Evans, 
stating that the most robust approach was to satisfy the target by looking at people’s 
actual expectations, because it was quite unclear to central banks how people’s 
expectations were formed. Regarding Christiano’s paper, he voiced doubt on the results 
of undesirable equilibria under a version of inflation targeting. He suggested that the  11
real problem would not be in a policy objective, but in a particular mechanical feedback 
rule. He proposed that one important area of future research was to provide the means to 
successfully implement a targeting procedure, based on realistic assumptions on 
information availability for central banks. He added that the other important topic was 
to examine how to define target criteria, which robustly approximated optimal policy in 
complex environments. 
 
John B. Taylor 
Following the presentation by Woodford, Taylor also insisted that robustness was the 
real issue, on which he would like to see more research in the future. He added that 
given the technology of simulation and collecting models, it was much easier to carry 
out robust analyses than in the past. As a frontier for research, he pointed to the 
operations of monetary policy in the money markets. Regarding the recent financial 
turmoil, he stated that among several explanations such as increased risk and greater 
liquidity demand, the counterparty risk between banks explained nearly everything 
about the LIBOR-OIS spread. Then he discussed some of the actions proposed by the 
Fed, such as the Term Auction Facility. He showed that although at the beginning there 
might have been some effect, more recently the rate was rising as the amount of 
intervention increased. He concluded that it was difficult to find an effect. Much more 
work needed to be done, and this went to the heart of monetary policy, and this was a 
major policy issue for the United States and other central banks. He concluded that 
much could be learned from Japan too, since Japan had gone through this sort of 
financial turmoil in the 1990s. 
 
Mark Gertler 
Gertler began by saying that there had been great progress in developing 
optimization-based macro models, but referred at the same time to the cynical view that 
newly developed groupthink might have set the stage for the next global economic 
contraction, because all the central banks were going to make the same mistakes using 
the same models. He then mentioned that these models were well suited to address the 
problems of the past, and listed a couple of challenges. As a first issue, the discussion 
over targeting headline or core inflation was raised. Given the way the cost of inflation 
was modeled in the New Keynesian framework, core rather than headline inflation 
should be targeted. He raised the question, however, as to whether such thinking should 
be revised in the face of the recent, very sustained increase in oil and commodity prices. 
As a second issue, he cited exchange rate management by emerging market economies. 
He mentioned that although theory preferred flexible exchange rates, many countries  12
stabilized their exchange rates, which could be a major factor in global inflation. He 
pointed out the necessity of introducing institutional restraints when applying 
optimization-based models to emerging economies. As a final point, he mentioned 
financial fragility. He stated that the existing models had not captured the potential for 
the liquidity disruptions that central banks were concerned with, and more explicit 
structural modeling of the financial institutions was needed to unravel questions such as 
the degree of financial fragility. In particular, he pointed to the enormous amount of 
funds now intermediated by institutions that were outside the regulatory structure. 
 
George Evans 
G. Evans summarized the contributions of the learning literature, pointing to two major 
achievements: (1) theoretical foundations on the E-stability principle under 
least-squares learning and (2) applications to a wide range of models. Regarding the 
applications to monetary policy, some studies examined the stability under learning and 
others investigated the optimal monetary policy under learning. One important 
phenomenon under learning was the emergence of escape routes, which could explain 
the dynamics of hyperinflation or a liquidity trap. Another line of research introduced 
learning by policymakers or private agents in explaining the Great Inflation or the 
subsequent disinflation in the United States. As for the robustness of monetary policy, G. 
Evans remarked that the learning perspective, especially on the part of policymakers, 
should be introduced in the literature. He also mentioned a recent paper of his that 
showed asset price bubbles could emerge if agents were learning not only the expected 
rate but also the conditional volatility of return. As topics for future research, he raised 
the issue of dynamic model selection, in which agents had potentially misspecified 
models and chosen a model through learning procedure. He also mentioned other issues 
such as the incorporation of structural knowledge in learning procedure and the 
investigation of learning dynamics in models with heterogeneous agents. 
 
Lawrence Christiano 
After stating that what was exciting about economic research was that it was driven by 
observations, Christiano predicted that the current financial turmoil in the United States 
was going to place financial frictions front and center on everyone’s research agenda for 
at least a decade. Then he raised several challenges for DSGE modeling. First, he 
pointed out the uncovered interest rate parity puzzle as an amazingly difficult one to 
work with. He added that this puzzle was particularly interesting because the uncovered 
interest parity relationship came from the standard intertemporal Euler equations. If 
there was a problem with that equation, this meant there was a problem that went right  13
to the core of the models used intensively today. After pointing to the modeling of 
financial market imperfections and labor market frictions as remaining challenges, he 
presented the view that models based on limited information could be an alternative 
framework attracting much attention in the future. It was shown that the information 
confusion was potentially the explanation of why the inflation responded slowly to the 
monetary shock but quickly to the technology shock. At the same time, following the 
argument made by Gertler, he mentioned that there was an amazing, probably unhealthy, 




Sims raised the issue of central bank balance sheets. Standard models introduced a 
unified government budget constraint in which the central bank was merged with the 
rest of the government. In such models, the question of how much capital the central 
bank had was irrelevant. Sims remarked that this kind of treatment worked well when 
the central bank had positive seigniorage and was completely independent from the 
treasury. However, in reality there are many central banks that had a chronic negative 
net worth or negative seigniorage. Sims said that for these central banks there might be 
a threat to the central bank independence, because if these central banks were perfectly 
independent of the treasuries then the central banks lost any fiscal resources. He added 
that since these central banks were unable to send positive seigniorage to their 
governments, the treasuries could try to force the central banks to finance government 
deficits. In such a case, a central bank’s monetary policymaking would be significantly 
affected and the coefficient on the inflation rate in the Taylor rule would be bounded. He 
also claimed that to guarantee the central bank independence, some legislative oversight 
would be needed to check whether the central bank properly fulfilled its function of 
stabilizing inflation and the economy. Finally, he remarked that these issues were all 
linked with financial market problems, and economists needed models to discuss such 
issues in a coherent way. 
 
Maurice Obstfeld 
Obstfeld presented a historical overview of how the two roles of central banking, that is, 
monetary policy and financial (or prudential) policy, played out in the evolution of the 
international monetary system. He explained that after the final breakdown of the gold 
standard in 1971, financial markets had been somewhat liberalized both at the national 
and international levels. Yet there was a serious inflation problem in the 1970s. Because 
of this experience, much work had been done concerning models of inflation targeting.  14
He stated, however, that research had not kept up with reality, because the recent DSGE 
models were not well designed to deal with the issue of financial crises, which were 
inherently discontinuous and highly nonlinear convulsions in financial markets. He 
stated that there had been some recent progress in the literature of international finance 
to investigate portfolio demands in incomplete markets, but this modeling is not 
sufficiently advanced to assess the bankruptcy risks inherent in financial institutions’ 
cross-border asset and liability positions. He claimed that the issue should not be 
investigated in a purely domestic context, because international cross-border flows of 
funds were an essential feature of modern deregulated financial markets. He then 
remarked that it was important to investigate from a global perspective whether the 
central bank should have macro-prudential policies as an additional tool alongside 
interest rate policy. He explained that it was highly problematic to impose financial 
restrictions in a global context, because it yielded disadvantages for domestic 
institutions and there were opportunities for evasion that were less easy in a purely 
domestic context. He also claimed that the exchange rate mechanism for transmitting 
financial problems was one more important issue for investigation. 
 
Bennett T. McCallum 
McCallum first mentioned that rational expectations were so much a part of economic 
analysis that many papers did not even bother to state that it was the hypothesis or 
assumption being used. Yet there were many issues such as indeterminacy, learnability, 
and so forth, instead of rational expectations, on which there really was not complete 
agreement. It was recommended that we find the most fruitful way to conduct scientific 
investigations in this area concerning expectations. Then he commented on the frontiers 
in monetary policy by considering the current monetary policy framework of the BOJ. 
First, he raised the question of whether it was good or bad to have a hierarchical 
mandate for price stability and macroeconomic stabilization. He added that the 
statement in the Bank of Japan Law could be interpreted in a hierarchical way, that is, as 
saying that monetary policy could contribute best to sound development of the national 
economy through the pursuit of price stability. Then he discussed the communication 
policy. He insisted that the goals of monetary policy should be made somewhat explicit, 
but central banks should not publish the path of future values of policy interest rates, 
because they were highly conditional and when conditions changed the public would 
inevitably get the impression that the policy had changed even when it had not in a 
fundamental sense. He added that we needed to know what central banks should be 
explicit about in communicating with the public. It might be just the policy rate, the 
policy design, or the objective function. He strongly recommended that the  15
communication be made through actions. He referred to the actions taken by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, through which the public came to know and appreciate the 
priority of inflation prevention as an overall goal, not because of the clarity of that 
central bank’s announcements, but because of its actions. 
 
Discussions 
There were intensive discussions on the market liquidity. Shirakawa raised the question 
of what market liquidity was by saying that we did not know how it was generated and 
maintained, but monetary policy seemed to have something to do with it. David Altig 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) pointed out the different definitions among panelists 
and questioned whether we could capture the liquidity in a model where policy was 
fundamentally about manipulating overnight interest rates as in the model of Woodford. 
Similarly, Jan Marc Berk (De Nederlandsche Bank) raised the issue of whether the 
current workhorse paradigm without monetary aggregates as presented at this 
conference might have some limits for explaining what was actually happening in the 
economy. Furthermore, Kazumasa Iwata (Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo) 
responded to the presentation by Taylor that the contraction of the LIBOR-TIBOR 
spread was due to the combination of quantitative easing and injection of public funds 
to the banks. Bullard agreed with Gertler that an enormous amount of intermediation 
funds was provided outside the regulated banking system and asked what the 
appropriate policy response was to the situation. 
Taylor agreed with the point raised by Shirakawa that what was needed was to 
find ways to measure what people said was liquidity. Although Taylor added that the 
concept of liquidity might not be a major issue as the chart for CD rates and LIBOR 
showed, it could be measured by such a method as the non-arbitrage models. Sims 
commented on this and replied that it was not very easy to draw a distinction between 
counterparty risk and liquidity. Sims added that if there existed an information problem 
on the value of assets, the liquidity problem could be a counterparty risk problem, 
where some assets would have counterparties underneath them that people were not sure 
about. On this point and the recent financial turmoil, Nishimura added that there was 
no reliable method to measure probability in tail events as of now and it was a serious 
problem to devise reasonable policy without reliable measurement of probability. 
Regarding the questions of Altig and Berk, Gertler replied that the liquidity in his and 
Christiano’s models was about the balance sheet (of firms without enough capital), 
which could cause fluctuations. Woodford then responded that there was not that much 
connection between what the recent developments had shown was important and the 
traditional concern of institutions like the European Central Bank with monitoring the  16
growth of monetary aggregates. Furthermore, regarding the question raised by Bullard, 
Woodford added that to the extent the balance-sheet problem related to financial 
intermediaries other than commercial banks, traditional monetary aggregates were less 
relevant than they had been in the past. Gertler also responded that even if there were 
institutions outside regulation, they might ultimately go to the Fed either directly or 
indirectly for help in obtaining short-term funds, but this was not suggesting that we 
should impose a capital requirement on these institutions, since there were some 
important differences between these institutions and banks. Taylor added that the one 
group of institutions which had done quite well comprised the ones that had not been 
regulated. Therefore, Taylor warned that we should think carefully about whether to 
extend the regulatory supervisory responsibilities much further. Taylor agreed with the 
point raised by Iwata, but added that we did not always have to rely on public funds, 
because many institutions were providing capital to increase the level of capital, and the 
financial system now had a very promising flexible feature, where the credit crunch was 
not “crunching” as much as one might think, because there was actually a lot of capital 
out there.   
Charles Evans (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) raised the issue of central 
bank communication and questioned how we should communicate as central bankers. C. 
Evans added that under a risk management or robust approach that was often discussed, 
policy could become very discretionary, which we should not aspire to. 
G. Evans responded that he was not sure we should announce specific interest 
rate trajectories, but we could certainly announce the way in which monetary policy 
would be conditional. G. Evans added that, for example, by making the statement that 
interest rates would be low for quite some time but would increase substantially when it 
became absolutely clear the economy was no longer in recession, central banks could 
spell out the conditional trajectory. Levin also noted a substantial gap between 
monetary theory and the practice of monetary policy--at least in some major industrial 
economies--with regard to the adoption of an explicit long-term goal for inflation.  
Levin continued that the theory provides a compelling rationale for establishing an 
explicit inflation objective, but some policymakers have ongoing concerns that an 
explicit inflation goal might constrain the conduct of monetary policy with respect to 
stabilization of the real economy. Miyako  Suda (BOJ) raised the importance of 
investigating voting activity for monetary policy decision making as a related frontier 
research agenda. Sheryl Kennedy (Bank of Canada) followed this argument: when 
there were for example, six or twelve decision makers, it would not be easy to put out 
an interest rate path or a policy rule that was agreed to by everybody. Kennedy added 
that this was the frontier for practitioners and we needed to investigate how to  17
communicate effectively in this circumstance. 
Wataru Takahashi (BOJ-IMES) asked what kind of international coordination 
would be desirable under the ongoing globalization, which was a major issue as 
discussed at this conference. Takahashi also pointed out the possible gains from policy 
coordination against the current financial turmoil. Taylor replied to this that under 
rational expectations, staggered contracts, and capital mobility, there was not much gain 
from policy coordination as long as each country followed its optimal rule. Taylor 
added, however, that the problem with this result was that in reality many countries 
were not following the same optimal policy such as inflation targeting. Taylor 
concluded that under the circumstances where some countries adopted an exchange rate 
peg policy, there could be gains from coordinating in some way but they would not be 
based on the classic coordination literature. 
There were also comments on the presentations made by panelists. Kimball 
discussed the arguments regarding core versus headline inflation. He argued that the 
reason why we should focus on core inflation was because it was supposed to be stickier, 
but we needed to investigate much more exactly as to which prices were stickier. C. 
Evans commented on the argument that there was too much agreement on models and 
questioned whether this meant that we needed to explore alternatives. Toni Braun 
(University of Tokyo) then followed that the consensus models were not well suited to 
answering the current credit issues that the United States was facing. Braun insisted 
that although there had been many banking events in the past, the important subject was 
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 Appendix 3: Biography of Haruo Mayekawa 
 
Haruo Mayekawa joined the Bank of Japan in 1935, and served as the Bank’s Governor 
from 1979 to 1984. (For details, please see the attached personal history.) He is 
remembered today as one of the most respected governors in the Bank’s history. He 
contributed to the internationalization of the Bank of Japan and of Japan as a whole, and 
worked to stabilize inflation and macroeconomic activity during the second oil crisis in 
the early 1980s. In addition, he established the Bank’s Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies. He also chaired the advisory council to the Prime Minister that in 
1986 published the influential “Mayekawa Report,” which proposed a number of policy 
prescriptions for the Japanese economy, with the aim of improving Japan’s position in 
the international economy. 
 
In the 1960s, as the Director-General of the Bank of Japan’s Foreign Department and as 
Executive Director, Mr. Mayekawa worked hard in service of the Bank’s 
internationalization. Having already focused on issues of international finance earlier in 
his career,* he recognized the necessity of building good relationships with other central 
banks and international organizations. He played a major role in the Bank of Japan’s 
rejoining the Bank for International Settlements, participating in the meetings of the 
G-10 countries, and hosting the International Monetary Fund’s annual meeting in 
Tokyo. 
* In Japan, Mr. Mayekawa was known as the man who had experienced “three surrenders” during World 
War II: in 1943, he worked as the Bank of Japan’s representative in Rome; subsequently, he was sent to 
the Bank’s Berlin office; and following the capitulation of Germany, he escaped through Russia to 
Japan, experiencing Japan’s unconditional surrender in Tokyo in August 1945. Following Japan’s 
surrender, he succeeded in persuading the Occupation Forces to retain the yen as the nation’s currency.   
 
The second oil crisis began while he was serving as Governor. Having already learned 
the lessons of the first oil crisis, he sought to stabilize inflation expectations through 
monetary tightening, a policy that can be understood in hindsight as following the 
Taylor Principle.  His policy prescription minimized damage caused by the second oil 
crisis, and won praise from leading economists abroad such as Milton Friedman.  His 
policy achievement of maintaining low inflation expectations was considered to be the 
engine for sustainable growth without inflation in 1980s Japan. 
 
In 1982, Governor Mayekawa established the Institute for Monetary and Economic 
Studies of the Bank of Japan. Because of his deep respect for academia, he believed in the necessity of maintaining a high-quality research function in monetary and economic 
studies. In particular, he stressed the importance of fundamental research for 
understanding the nature of current economic issues. As the institute’s founder, he 
recommended long-term rather than short-term analyses and esteemed the freedom and 
autonomy of research at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. At the same 
time, he set a high priority on promoting the exchange of research between the 
institute’s economists and academics both in Japan and abroad.  This priority is 
reflected especially in the visiting scholar system, which helps enhance the Bank’s 
research capability. 
 
After retiring from the Governor of the Bank of Japan, in 1985, Mr. Mayekawa was 
selected to chair an advisory council to the Prime Minister, the “Study Group on 
Adjustment of the Economic Structure for International Cooperation.” The report 
published by this group, known as the “Mayekawa Report,” contained policy 
prescriptions to mitigate Japan’s trade imbalances and promote sustainable growth in 
the international economy. The main recommendations stressed the importance of (1) 
increases in domestic demand, (2) structural transformation of industries, (3) market 
opening, (4) financial liberalization and internationalization, and (5) promotion of 
international cooperation. These recommendations formed the basic guideline for 
subsequent Japanese economic policy and thus promoted deregulation and further 
internationalization. 
 
Last but not least, Mr. Mayekawa is remembered very fondly by many, including those 
both inside and outside the Bank of Japan. He enjoyed relaxing after work at pubs with 
young central bankers, and at international meetings was known familiarly as “Mike” 
and earned a great deal of both respect and affection. At the same time, he was a very 
modest person. He refused the First Order, and once said that he disliked any order that 
ranked people hierarchically. Because of his great humility, if he were alive today he 
would doubtlessly disapprove of our naming this commemorative lecture after him for 
the institute’s international conference, but we hope nevertheless he would understand 
our firm wish to commemorate his example.   Haruo MAYEKAWA 
 
Date of Birth: February 6, 1911 
Education: 1935, LL.B., The University of Tokyo 
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